It was hard to see who or what could replace the secular regime, since no organised political opposition had ever been allowed to develop. Core legitimacy rested in the power of the regime to maintain social and sectarian equilibrium - and hence political stability. Seven months later, in November, sectarian violence had begun in earnest in the third largest city of Homs, boding ill for the rest of the country. Developments in December remained ominious, showing parts of society descending into mayhem and fear, and their geopolitical implications were clearly potentially very significant: Though some international actors view this as a historic opportunity to alter the regional balance of power in their favour, its inherent risks are tremendous, not least considering the increasing sectarian divisions in neighbouring Iraq and the risks of fragmentation of state authority in that country. 

Reply to RFI in April 2011

This will get worse

Summary

• Syria has no substantial or strategic assets except for its geographic position. It forms part of the strategic alliance with Iran, the main spiritual, ideological and financial supporter of Hezbollah. Syria thus facilitates Iran’s geopolitical influence in the Levant, adding to both countries invariable opposition towards “Western” interests. 
• The Syrian minority regime in power since 1970 initially based its power on command structures founded in colonial times, when French authorities sought to control the overwhelming majority of Syria’s Sunni population by encouraging minorities, foremost Christians and Alawites, to join the armed forces. In 1967, Hafiz al-Assad became minister of defence and in 1970 he ousted the president and military ruler and established his authority over the regime. Since then, the Assad family and clan have been in power – and Alawites have been placed in most decisive positions from top to bottom of the command and control chain. No well organised political opposition has been allowed to develop.
• Reforms are not possible lest the regime falls. If it deems itself threatened, it will reply with the only means at its disposal: massive violence.
• Regime legitimacy has partly rested upon its resistance towards Israel and America. Although this position is popular, it will no longer suffice to mitigate the quest for freedom, democracy and material development as expressed by a young and growing population, inspired by what is happening in several other countries in the region. Nor will it suffice to buy the acquiescence or forcefully suppress the opinion within the big Sunni majority.
• The most plausible outcome will be that the apparent concessions held out by the regime, will only trigger renewed demands for openness and democracy and demonstrations thereby adopting an increasingly – and excessively dangerous - regime-threatening nature and that the regime will reply in kind.