Sudan Assessment July 2011

By a large actor in the humanitarian field, Vesper was asked to assess what consequences and possible repercussions would ensue from the partition into two states of the Sudan. Vesper swiftly used its in-house experience from the area and academic acumen to provide a brief but solid assessment on the matter, defining both mitigating circumstances and risk pointers for the coming period.

Brief Summary

  • Although differences persist beneath the mutual recognition, in the immediate term (2-4 months), no decisive international crisis will  re-emerge from the division of Sudan into two separate state entities on the 9th of July 2011.  However, mounting militarization on both sides of the disputed North-South border is cause for concern – and clashes involving rogue forces and secessionists occurred in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces prior to the partition and might well escalate.
  • No certain predictions could be made as to the future stability of the remainder of Sudan, still one of Africa’s largest countries. Identifiable centrifugal forces are at work and domestic rivalries and dissent could yet again surface in Khartoum, adding potentially dangerous impetus to the period that lies ahead. Khartoum faces rebellion in Darfur - and the potential for unrest (and uprisings) in several other parts of the country should not be ignored.
  • Critical issues for Omar Bashir’s government and for the relationship between the two states include the demarcation of the common border, the distribution of oil revenues, access to water from the river Nile, the contested oil-rich region of Abyei, the settling of international debt and a few other outstanding questions. Local armed militias might continue their activities, not least along parts of the 2,010 km long border, especially in The Blue Nile and South Kordofan provinces. 
  • Numerous statistical data seem to undermine the viability of the new-born state of South Sudan. However, progress has been made in several respects, if mostly in the capital Juba and its immediate surroundings; business life is thriving, many investors seeking to exploit lucrative deals with the new government and in connection with the growing U.N. presence.
  • Regime and state stability will depend on relations with Sudan, ethnic inclusiveness, the (equitable) distribution of the proceeds from oil-production, (some 95 % of the national income), national cohesiveness based on enhanced infrastructure, decentralized economic investment policies and the ability to exploit the country’s huge natural resources, from pastures and cattle, to minerals and metals.